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Abstract 
In contrast to many of today's sectarian religious figures, Thomas 
Aquinas was interested in engaging the best of secular philosophy; seeing 
what his tradition could gain from philosophy and how his tradition could 
contribute to philosophy. Speaking from within the Christian tradition, he 
offers helpful insights that contribute to our understanding of Aristotle. 
Aquinas' writings are largely devoted to the project of demonstrating that 
the works of Aristotle are complementary to, and in agreement with, 
Christianity. The excerpts of Summa Theologiae examined in this paper 
deal with friendship and are a sample of Aquinas' larger project. This paper 
examines how Aquinas undertakes to reconcile the Christian idea of 
charity (love for enemies) with Aristotle's conception of preferential 
friendship. Aquinas' finding is that in Christian charity, the classical 
understanding of friendship has been perfected by grace.  
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Within western civilization, there is a long-running dispute over which 
authority, the Christian tradition or Greek philosophical tradition, is the more 
trustworthy and comprehensive. Like other topics written about by Plato and 
Aristotle, friendship became part of this controversy. During Thomas Aquinas' 
time, this struggle was focused on whether the works of Aristotle could be 
reconciled with Christianity. Aquinas' writings are largely devoted to the project 
of demonstrating that these two sources are, in fact, complementary and in 
agreement. The excerpts of Summa Theologiae that deal with friendship are a 
sample of Aquinas' larger project; in them, he undertakes to reconcile the 
Christian idea of charity with Aristotle's conception of friendship. Other Christian 
commentators on Aristotle rejected his formulation of friendship because they 
thought it did not allow for love towards enemies or for God to befriend man. 
Aquinas' treatment of love and charity anticipates and rebuffs these arguments 
as to why Aristotle's ideal of friendship is incompatible with Christian notions of 
charity. Aquinas holds that in Christian charity, the classical understanding of 
friendship has been perfected by grace.  
For Aquinas, the inaccuracy of human understanding, due to its reliance 
on sense perception, creates the appearance of disagreement between 
knowledge acquired through reason and that which is received through 
revelation. Ultimately however, these two sources find the same truth, because 
“the revealer of divine truth, is also the author of nature” (Fortin, 252). In order 
to eliminate the perceived disagreement between reason and revelation, 
Aquinas undertakes to “reinterpret Aristotle on the basis of the Christian faith 
and to reform Christian theology in terms of Aristotelian philosophy” (Fortin, 
248). 1 Aquinas holds that theology and philosophy will be found to be in 
agreement when they are both properly understood.  
The most obvious difference between the Christian treatment of friendship 
and its treatment by Aristotle is that Christian writings pay comparatively little 
attention to the topic. More often than mentioning friendship, “scriptures draw 
upon familial and kinship metaphors” (Heffernan, 171). In place of friendship, 
the gospel emphasizes charity – loving God, loving our neighbours as 
ourselves, and even loving our enemies. In relation to Christian charity's 
universality, classical friendship seems discriminatory, preferential and self-
serving. As a result, friendship has rarely been emphasized in Europe's 
Christian theological tradition. The writings of Aquinas are one of the principal 
exceptions. Friendship is particularly important for Aquinas because he 
understands that efforts to establish peace and justice will not succeed unless 
they are grounded in love and friendship (Finnis, 227). In contrast to much of 
the Christian tradition both before and after him, “we find in Aquinas neither a 
rejection nor even a diminution of friendship; rather we find friendship elevated 
and transformed by the order of grace” (Heffernan, 175). As in his works on 
other topics, Aquinas' writings on love and charity emphasize that revelation 
completes and perfects nature, rather than casting it aside. 
Aquinas' first extensive discussion of friendship in Summa Theologiae 
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occurs in Questions 26-28 of section I-II within a discussion of love as a 
passion. In Aquinas' thinking, this is the same kind of love dealt with by earlier 
secular philosophers. He argues that desire for good things for oneself and 
desire for good things for one's friends largely overlap – our individual self-
interests are obscured as friendship causes us to rise above egoistical 
concerns and pursue a common good. The second treatment of friendship, 
consisting of Questions 23-46 in section II-II, is more theological than 
philosophical. The insights about human friendships offered in this section are 
based on Aquinas' conception of God's relationship with humans. The purest 
form of friendship is charity; its characteristics are perfected forms of what we 
see in natural friendship (Pakaluk, 146). Consequently, understanding charity 
helps us to understand the limitations of natural friendships as well as the full 
potential for what natural friendships can be.  
At the beginning of the first section, Aquinas defines friendship, dilection, 
and charity, each of which is closely related to love, the object of his inquiry. 
Whereas friendship is a habit, love and dilection are expressed in passion and 
action. For its part, charity can be either a habit or wilful action. Charity and 
dilection are love, but love is not necessarily charity or dilection. Specifically, 
dilection is love that is entered into solely as the result of a wilful decision of the 
intellect (Aquinas, 153). To further define friendship, Aquinas modifies 
Aristotle's threefold categorization of the types of friendship. Love of friendship, 
which corresponds to Aristotle's complete friendship, is towards someone for 
whom the lover desires the good, while love of concupiscence encompasses 
Aristotle's friendship for pleasure and friendship for utility. Love of 
concupiscence is towards the good that we desire for ourselves or for our 
beloved. Objects which are the focus of this love are not loved for themselves 
but for the good they bring (Aquinas, 154-155). By distinguishing between 
these two kinds of loves, Aquinas shows clearly that there is no real friendship 
unless we act for the good of others (Finnis, 112). 
Having identified the types of love, Aquinas tries to discover what effects 
love causes. His conclusion is that every human action and all human emotions 
are caused by love (Aquinas, 170-171). For instance, pleasure might seem to 
be the cause of some action, but really love of pleasure causes the person to 
act to obtain pleasure (Aquinas, 161). Union is one of the principal effects of 
love, both bringing lovers together physically and uniting them in affection 
(Aquinas, 162-163). Even as these two types of union usually overlap, so do 
love of concupiscence and love of friendship overlap in our relationships. We 
love our friends with the love of concupiscence, meaning that our good 
depends on them, because it is derived from them. We love friends with the 
love of friendship which means that we also want them to experience the good 
for their own sake. Our self-love and love for others coincide – we altruistically 
want the best for them because we care about them, and we egoistically want 
the best for them because our good depends on their good. The lover 
apprehends the beloved as his other self because they share a common good 
(Aquinas, 165). According to Thomasian friendship, individuals desire each 
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others' good for the common good, not for their own sake (Finnis, 115). 
In Questions 26-28 of section I-II, Aquinas succeeds in describing an 
Aristotelian conception of friendship that is quite compatible with the Christian 
tradition. The challenge that Aquinas next faces is to account for the bible's 
radical teachings about charity within the framework of Aristotelian friendship. 
Scriptural passages such as Luke 6:23 show the Greek understanding of 
friendship to be manifestly insufficient: “if you love those who love you, what 
credit is that to you? For even sinners love those who love them” (NRSV). 
Aquinas acknowledges that the Greek understanding of friendship is 
inadequate, accounting only for human friendships apart from God and failing 
to satisfy the New Testament's moral imperatives. However, Aquinas still 
values Aristotle's philosophy as the best available account of human friendship. 
As Robert Sokolowski explains, friendship serves the important function of 
anticipating that which charity is, elevated by grace (qtd. in Heffernan 181). 
Charity is described in Questions 23-46 of section II-II as an explicitly Christian 
form of friendship pertaining to man's friendship with God and to man's 
friendship with his neighbours which is undertaken because of love for God.  
To illustrate the relationship of charity to friendship and to define the place 
of friendship within Christian theology, Aquinas (172) quotes John 15:15, “I do 
not call you servants any longer... but I have called you friends” (NRSV). 
Accordingly, God's relationship of charity to humans is a type of friendship 
(Heffernan, 176-77). As divine friendship, charity is a perfection of the flawed 
friendships that humans experience apart from God. Humans who respond to 
this God-initiated friendship, love God and love their neighbours for God's sake, 
extending charity towards all of humanity. Christian charity, like Aristotelian 
friendship, demands that friends wish good things for each other. The 
difference, notes Aquinas, is that charity desires friends to possess eternal 
spiritual goods (Heffernan, 179). Charity refines rather than replaces friendship. 
As a love that desires good for someone else, charity can be strictly understood 
as a type of friendship. The other important requirement of friendship that 
charity meets is that it is based on relationship and mutual love. Man's 
response to God, love's initiator, is charity. It is actually quite possible for man 
to enjoy the kind of fellowship with God that can be called friendship; however, 
it is a spiritual rather than a corporeal relationship (Aquinas, 172). The 
metaphor suggests itself that, as the spiritual is to the temporal, so is charity to 
unredeemed friendship.  
Though Aquinas can explain how charity between God and man is a type 
of friendship, it is more difficult to explain how charity between a man and his 
enemy can be friendship. At the root of this question is the requirement of 
charity that humans love their enemies as an extension of loving God, because 
all people belong to God. Since Aristotle insists that friendship requires love to 
be reciprocated, the greatest obstacle for Aquinas in reconciling Aristotelian 
friendship with Christianity is that he must explain how loving an enemy 
includes reciprocal love (Heffernan, 180). Aquinas himself recognizes that “a 
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certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and 
friend” (172). If friendship is necessarily between two friends, it does not seem 
that charity directed towards an enemy can be friendship. To explain how 
charity still qualifies as friendship, Aquinas claims that we love enemies by 
extension when they are loved by our friends. We love our enemies indirectly 
because, within a few degrees of separation, we are related to them in 
friendship. Friendship thus extends to everyone through friends of friends 
(Heffernan, 180). Though our enemies do not reciprocate our friendship, God 
ultimately does on their behalf. Rather than being autonomous friendships, 
charity towards sinners is an integral component of friendship with God: “it is 
specifically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby we love our 
neighbour” (Aquinas, 175). As Aquinas states in De caritate 7 and 9, “in loving 
our neighbour... charity has God for its formal object and not merely as its 
ultimate end” (cited in Aumann). Charity towards our neighbour is conjoined 
with charity towards God because the good which we want for our neighbour is 
the same as the good that we want for God: that they may dwell in each other 
(Aquinas, 175). Our reciprocal relationship of charity-friendship with God 
causes us to be in charity-friendship with all those who belong to God (ie. 
everyone, including our enemies).  
The next difficulty for Aquinas in harmonizing charity with the classical 
understanding of friendship is that, in the classical world, friendship was 
understood to be contingent on virtue. 2 It seems that charity cannot be 
understood as being only between the virtuous, because it is extended to 
enemies and to the unrighteous (Aquinas, 171-72). Nevertheless, Aquinas 
maintains that charity is friendship that is based on virtue. The friendship of 
charity is first and foremost directed towards God, because of his virtue; charity 
directed to sinners does not consist of autonomous friendships but is a 
necessary part of friendship with God (Aquinas, 173). However, it must be 
admitted that virtue is not the cause of God's friendship towards man: “God 
does not love things because they are good... but they are good because God 
loves them” (Aumann). Aquinas partially maintains the classical requisite that 
friendship be based on virtue, only he specifies that charity is based entirely on 
God's virtue, not ours or our neighbour's. 
Another objection to the reconciliation of charity with classical friendship 
arises from the incongruity between the requirement of charity to love sinners 
and Aristotle's claim, in Nichomachean Ethics VIII.8, that to be loved is to be 
honoured (cited in Aquinas, 175). If charity denotes love in Aristotle's sense, it 
would follow that sinners must be honoured. Aquinas argues that since honour 
is always given in proportion to virtue, honouring unrighteous friends does not 
require ascribing spurious honour to them, but only recognizing them for 
whatever virtue they have (175-76). Like other types of friendship, charity 
functions on the basis of proportionality; it gives honour to those who merit 
honour as classical friendship requires it to. 3  
Aquinas is further criticized that borrowing from the classical 
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understanding of love has made him a proponent of selfishness rather 
than true charity. Christians who emphasize a gospel of self-denial and 
renunciation are suspicious of Aquinas' ideas about self-love (Aumann). As 
evidence that we ought to love ourselves, Aquinas (182) cites Leviticus 10:18 
“Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself”. Though we cannot be friends to 
ourselves, if we did not love ourselves, we would not be able to love others. 
Charity requires us to love others, but loving others is rooted in and dependent 
on our love for ourselves. However, the common good should be sought more 
than private goods (Aquinas, 183), and love for God should exceed self-love 
(Aumann). The best-informed and most appropriate form of self-love is to 
desire one's own salvation (Aquinas 180-182). Grace can elevate self-love 
above sinful appetites to find expression in the truest kind of self-love, desire for 
nothing other than fellowship with God. The strength of Aquinas' conception of 
self-love is that it advocates a healthy understanding of self-love rather than 
succumbing to hypocritical self-denial. By arguing that individuals should seek 
the common good, he allows an appropriate amount of concern for one's own 
spiritual good, while not rejecting sacrificial love as embodied by the cross. The 
product of Aquinas' syncretism between Greek and Christian thought actually 
seems to be more accurate and noble than the sum of its parts. 
Through his questions on love and charity in the Summa Theologiae, 
Aquinas is largely successful in harmonizing Aristotle's insights into friendship 
with Christian doctrine on love and charity. Believing that imperfect, temporal 
goods are nonetheless blessings intentionally bestowed on man by God, 
Aquinas does not reject classical friendship for being below the grace of charity 
(Heffernan, 182). Instead, he argues that the classical comprehension of 
friendship helps us to understand the nature of the perfect relationship of 
charity that God intends for us. Having recognized that the Christian tradition 
does little to account for friendship, Aquinas borrows from Aristotle, who 
articulates the most accurate human understanding of the topic. There are 
however, several undeniable incongruities between the two authorities that 
Aquinas must reconcile. He argues that as all friendship has its source in virtue, 
charity is derived from God, the initiator of charity towards whom our response 
of charity is directed. The reciprocation in this friendship happens between God 
and man, though the nature of this relationship is spiritual rather than corporeal. 
The love of enemies that is commanded by charity does not consist of 
autonomous friendship-relationships with enemies, but is an extension of man's 
love for God since all humans belong to him. Having navigated through these 
challenges, Aquinas has delivered a satisfactory account of charity as a divinely 
perfected type of natural friendship. 
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Endnotes 
1. It is beyond the scope of this essay to which authority Aquinas adheres to in 
cases of irreconcilable differences. Hernest Fortin's position is that "in Aquinas' 
works it is rather theology which is justified before the bar of reason or 
philosophy" (250).  
2. In Book VIII of Nichomachean Ethics, friendship as Aristotle describes it is 
based on virtue and is between virtuous people (cited in Aquinas, 172). 
3. The principal of proportionality is important to Aquinas' discussion of 
friendship in other cases, particularly in the sixth article of ST II-II Question 26 
where he discusses whether all neighbours must receive the same amount of 
love. 
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